Previous research suggests that free will beliefs and moral responsibility beliefs are strongly linked, yet ultimately distinct. Unfortunately, the most common measure of free will beliefs, the free will subscale (FWS) of the Free Will and Determinism Plus, seems to confound free will beliefs and moral responsibility beliefs. Thus, the present research (1,700 participants across two studies) details the development of a 2-factor FWS – the FWS-II – that divides the FWS into a free will subscale and a moral responsibility (...) subscale. The FWS-II showed good fit compared to standard fit thresholds and superior fit compared to the original FWS. The moral responsibility subscale was moderately correlated with general punitive attitudes and specific punitive assignments, even when controlling for the free will subscale. Conversely, the free will subscale was moderately correlated with conservativism and religiosity, even when controlling for the moral responsibility subscale. These results provide evidence that the FWS is better suited – psychometrically, theoretically, and practically – as a 2-factor measure of free will beliefs and moral responsibility beliefs than as a 1-factor measure of free will beliefs. (shrink)

A considerable number of books and papers have analyzed normative concepts using new techniques developed by logicians; however, few have bridged the gap between the English legal culture and the Continental tradition in legal philosophy. This book addresses this issue by offering an introductory study on the many possibilities that logical analysis offers the study of legal systems. The volume is divided into two sections: the first covers the basic aspects of classical and deontic logic and its connections, advancing an (...) explanation of the most important topics of the discipline by comparing different systems of deontic logic and exploring some of the most important paradoxes in its domain. The second section deals with the role of logic in the analysis of legal systems by discussing in what sense deontic logic and the logic of norm-propositions are useful tools for a proper understanding of the systematic structure of law. (shrink)

Cet article propose une lecture critique du Despotisme de la Chine, un texte riche mais peu commenté, où Quesnay expose explicitement le contenu de sa pensée politique. Par l’analyse de Despotisme de la Chine nous voudrions défendre trois idées qui font sens autour de la représentation de la Chine qui est faite par Quesnay. La première est naturellement de montrer en quoi ce texte est représentatif de la pensée de Quesnay (et, plus largement, de l’école des physiocrates). La deuxième est (...) de souligner que le cas de la Chine, tel qu’il est vu par Quesnay, permet de penser l’économie en tant qu’activité, discipline, ou même science qui se situe au cœur du fondement de la philosophie politique qu’il avance. La troisième est d’indiquer comment la compréhension des logiques économiques d’après Quesnay relève finalement d’une observation intelligente du réel, de lier la loi positive (le politique fondé par l’économique, pour ce qui est alors connu de la Chine) et la loi naturelle (en somme : ce qui est et ce qui doit être). Au cœur de ces trois vues se trouve une réflexion sur ce pays lointain et nul autre (sinon la France). Loin d’être un simple prétexte pour avancer ses arguments, la Chine est surtout une façon de voir, de révéler, de saisir la nature d’une pensée (la physiocratie), d’une discipline (l’économie), et de sa portée (la science et le politique). Codes JEL : A11, A12, B11, K10. (shrink)